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Abstract 
 
In conflict-prone and/or post-conflict environments, the action of violent non-state actors 
(VNSAs) brings up many security concerns and issues since it wedges in the grey zones of state 
authority. Indeed, violent non-state actors emerge and function countering the state: in the 
opposition to state authority they find their raison d’etre, since most of them challenge the 
legitimacy and the integrity of the state itself. A typology of violent non-state actors through the 
lines of authority over population or authority over territory can help us explain where the “lost 
spaces” of state sovereignty are. While during state collapse a certain typology of VNSAs 
emerge, post-conflict societies are keener to becoming the theatre of other types of VNSAs, 
such as criminal gangs which exploit the ties between legal and illegal spheres of state economy. 
The Western Balkans, in this sense, offer a perfect example of how different VNSAs counter 
state authority while trying to impose their own, since they have seen the emergence of all 
different types of VNSAs after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Yugoslavia: starting 
from insurgents and warlords during the Balkan Wars, criminal gangs that wedged in illegal 
trafficking of many types, and, more recently, jihadi groups belonging to transnational network 
of radicalized Islamic extremism.   
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“Looking forward, we think of the Republika Srpska as a free port  
where are guaranteed investment and social control.”  
 
(Milorad Stakic
1
, March 1996) 
 
Introduction 
Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) are increasingly gaining importance inside the field of 
International Relations theory. In conflict-prone and/or post conflict environments, the action of 
violent non-state actors (VNSAs) brings up many security concerns and issues since it wedges in 
the grey zones of state authority.  
This paper tries to shed light on the different violent non-state actors present in the 
Western Balkans after the end of the Cold War and on the respective states’ weakness. Indeed, 
violent non-state actors emerge and function countering the state: in the opposition to state 
authority they find their raison d’etre, since most of them challenge the legitimacy and the integrity 
of the state itself. A typology of violent non-state actors through the lines of authority over 
population or authority over territory can help us explain where the “lost spaces” of state 
sovereignty are. This also gives us a better understanding of VNSAs at large, differing them from 
one another while grasping their particular features.  
Afterwards the analysis shifts to the different Western Balkans countries with an overall 
post-Cold War assessment. In applying the typology of VNSAs to these countries, we can better 
appreciate the evolution that they have had during those years in terms of solidity and integrity. 
The paper then deals with the particular security issues stemming from each one of them, while 
trying to address possible future trajectories and policy implications.  
 
Violent Non-State Actors: A Typology 
In the XX century, the focus of International Relations Theory had been the study of the 
world order, the international system and the interplay among states (by looking also at their 
respective foreign policies). The main actors that interacted in the international realm were 
thereby the states, which were considered (at least in theory) as the last instance organizations 
where authority laid: the state does have the monopoly of the use of force in a given territory. 
Indeed, the “Hobbesian problem” of the lack of central authority shifted from inter-individual 
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 “Former leader of the <<Crisis Committee>>, condemned for war crimes.” [quoted in Strazzari 2008] 
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relations to international ones. In the world system we do not have a central authority that can 
settle disputes among states, thereby creating an anarchical environment where the risk of war is 
always present.  
However, in the last decades, many actors that transcend state boundaries and authority 
have risen, in many cases also by having a say in shaping agendas in world forums or even by 
influencing state policies. Such actors include international NGOs and multinational 
corporations. New problems emerge with these actors, as the state is asked by the citizens to 
tackle many different issues stemming from the action of such actors. Multinational corporations 
such as big high-tech or web-related companies can influence the state and its policies regarding, 
for example, employment and taxation. In any case, a common feature of these actors is that they 
use peaceful means trying to accomplish their agendas. Many other non-state actors are not 
peaceful in nature, embracing violent means of pursuing their goals. Violent non-state actors 
(VNSAs) emerge in contrast with state authority since they challenge it at the monopoly of the 
use of force (Vinci 2009).  
 Therefore, a first clarification should be made inside the ensemble of non-state actors: 
the use of force, or its lack of. VNSAs arise in conflict-prone environments and are usually one 
of the main reasons of the escalation of violence in a certain territory and timespan. Still, they 
differ a lot from each other, and a categorization is needed in order to better understand VNSAs, 
their nature and their actions.  
A categorization of VNSAs  
VNSAs emerge in contrast with state authority, more properly they challenge the 
monopoly that the state has on the use of force. The monopoly of the use of force is held by the  
state within a given territory, and is enforceable over a determined group of people: the ones that 
are part of the community which lives in that given territory. This means that the state, in its core 
essence, has a double degree of authority: over territory and over population, the lines where it 
can employ force as the sole legitimate user. Since VNSAs counter state authority, we can try to 
distinguish them across those same lines.  
Therefore the first indicator is the possible presence of authority over territory. If a VNSA 
has authority over a certain territory means that it firmly controls that piece of land and it deploys 
its jurisdiction over it. Boundaries may shift across time, but in any case a core part must always 
be under the control of the VNSA. The second indicator revolves around the authority over a 
group of people, i.e. over a certain (section of the) population. This authority is less tangible than 
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the first one, but however we consider it by a proxy: the legitimacy that the VNSA has in contrast 
with the state regarding to a certain group of people. The intersection between these two 
indicators gives us the grid of the typology of VNSAs (see Table 1, page 6).  
Weighing other indicators  
As to other possible indicators discarded for the purposes of this paper, one the first ones 
could be the organizational structure of the VNSAs. However the organizational structure is very 
nuanced and differs a lot across time and space. VNSAs can be decentralized or depend upon a 
strong centre, from more cellular structured to a quasi-state organization (Vinci 2009). The 
structure of a VNSA depends more on “ground” conditions and is not stable over time. This 
means that we cannot grasp a lot from such an indicator.  
Another possible way to study VNSAs is to look at the way they finance their operations 
and, that is, their very subsistence. Usually, when these actors emerge it means that we are at the 
fringes of state control and many grey zones of illegal economy emerge. These actors can then 
exploit this illegal ways of financing in order to strengthen their capabilities. Such means of illegal 
financing include drugs traffic, traffic of human beings, illegal arms trade, and support of a 
transnational network. Nonetheless there does not seem to be a single way that an actor decides 
to follow in order to finance itself. They can shift from one to the other depending on their 
capabilities, and the windows of opportunity that the same environment offers.  
The last indicator concerns the means of violence or, more specifically, the way in which 
violence is perpetrated. It is common to find classifications of VSNAs that differ from religious  
terrorist groups, to insurgent guerrilla groups etc. This classifications however has a shortcoming: 
it reflects the ways in which different actors conduct warfare; warfare conversely is strictly 
connected not only to relative capabilities, but also to strategic considerations. A small group 
cannot take over sustained conventional military campaigns, since they have not the capabilities 
to do it. Thus they would hypothetically prefer to carry on guerrilla warfare or terrorist attack. 
However this does not mean that once that they have more capabilities they automatically shift to 
more conventional means. Or, at least, if this happens, they could always use again less 
conventional means. Warfare is changing in more general terms even for states themselves, the 
ultimate actors of the international realm, becoming more hybrid in nature and, that is, involving 
many different, parallel and coexisting (more or less violent) means to achieve a certain goal. 
Thus, ways of conducting warfare do not offer clear-cut divisions of VNSAs.  
Fill in the blanks  
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Now it only remains to analyse how the two indicators found – that is, authority over 
territory and authority over population – intersect with each other and to what VNSAs 
corresponds each match.  
If a VNSA has both authority over territory and over population, it better fits the type of 
insurgents. Indeed an insurgent group is often constituted and based on ethnic grounds: thus the 
group has not only a great internal cohesion, but also it recalls a larger (imagined) community of 
people for which it battles (Anderson 1991). This (ethnic) group projects its aspirations to a 
certain piece of land, seen as crucial to its survival and to its future existence. Often it is looked 
at as a homeland, a place which the group is bound to for historical reasons and that is seen as 
indispensable (Toft 2003). Indeed insurgents do coagulate in a defined space, and are even 
backed up by a defined population in carrying on their actions (Toft and Zhukov 2015). This 
means that the VNSA in this case does not only have the control over a certain territory and 
population, but also the legitimacy given by the people to exist and continue fighting for their 
purposes. In this case nation-hood – and a common feeling of belonging to it – is actioned and 
used by the insurgents to get support since it is considered as a valued good for that group of 
people (Varshney 2003).  
A second type of VNSAs is defined by the presence of authority over population and by 
the absence of authority over territory: this is the case of jihadi groups. Jihadi groups are defined  
(mainly) cellular groups that advance political demands through the use of the ideology of jihad. 
It is true the many insurgent groups assume religious connotations, especially during ethnic 
conflicts (Wilhelmsen 2005). In this case they do not appear to be linked to any specific territory 
and do not need the support of grassroots members in order to achieve their subsistence (Toft 
and Zhukov 2015). However, this concerns more a situation where a civil war is on the line: 
religion functions as a sort of ethnic marker (Elbasani 2015) and it also helps to organize a violent 
situation (Wilhelmsen 2005). Indeed, in scenarios where overall peace is achieved, jihadi groups 
do have a control over a certain section of the population, mostly those who live in marginalized 
(sub-)urban areas (Manciulli 2017, Pioppi 2017), since even the control that sate has on these 
areas is not so strong (Vespa 2017). Local preachers often have a crucial importance in the 
process of radicalization of new members, so that the jihadi constellation does have a control on 
the population. Formally they are not linked to a certain piece of land. Even though Islam has 
played a key role in the civil wars broken out from 1940 to 2000 (Toft 2007), the practice of Islam 
is becoming increasingly less linked to ethnic conflicts, providing alternative explanations and fuel 
to violence, and a new space where global, regional and local processes converge (Elbasani and 
Roy 2015).  
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A VNSA that, conversely, has no authority over people but has a strong one over a 
territory is the type of warlords. A warlord can be defined as a “feudal landlord” (Marten 2013), 
imposing their control over a piece of land, ruling in defiance of state sovereignty. Of course they 
do have a control over militias or even on regional followings in some cases – creating a sort of 
“warlordism continuum” (Rich ed. 1999) – but the differences on such control can be very huge: 
that is, we cannot take it as a clear-cut indicator of the type of warlord. Even if warlords rule 
countering the state, modern types of warlords have increasingly gained the complicity of state 
leaders (Marten 2013). However, it goes beyond the scope of this paper to analyse such a 
relationship.  
The last type of VNSA does not present either authority over territory or authority over 
population: an example of this kind can be that of criminal gangs. Criminal gangs do not need 
either one of these kinds of authority in order to perpetuate their actions. They do not need the 
support of the population, since they do not depend on their legitimation or on their financing. 
Conversely they do not need a piece of land to impose their direct control on, because they 
depend more on governing different types of flows – arms trade, human and drugs trafficking etc. 
– and, moreover, they are not linked to a particular land by ethnic or historical ties. This leaves 
no space in where to put criminal gangs in our grid.  
 
Table 1 – The typology of VNSAs  
 
    Authority over Territory 
    
    Present Not Present 
    
Authority  
over  
Population 
Present  Insurgents  Jihadi Groups 
Not Present  Warlords  Criminal Gangs 
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A Post-Cold War Assessment of the Western Balkans’ VNSAs 
The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the ten-year long widespread violence and ethnic 
conflicts left on their wake a number of unresolved problems in the Western Balkan region. Two 
of the most prominent examples are definitely Bosnia and Kosovo. In Bosnia we have the division 
of the country in two distinct territorial entities (one being the Republika Srpska), and in Kosovo 
there are strong Serbian minorities in the northern municipalities. Moreover Kosovo is 
considered by Serbian people as the cradle of the Serbian nation since 1389, thus linking the 
particular territory of Kosovo to two different homelands: one being that of Serbia and the other 
one that of Kosovo Albanians.  
We can define the situation of Bosnia and Kosovo as frozen conflicts: stalemate situations 
of a given country or region, concerning territorial or minority disputes with a high degree of  
friction. These disputes coalesce different types of emotions – such as resentment, fear, hatred – 
and of political demands that cause friction among these different ethnic groups.  
When violence is perpetrated during a civil war, its logic does not follow only the national-
level cleavage. Local-level dynamics influence the use of violence since “the locus of agency in 
civil war is simultaneously located at different levels of aggregation”, even though local frictions 
follow the more general cleavage (Kalyvas 2006:365). In fact, in the Bosnian civil war violence 
firstly emerged when settling ethnic disputes, but afterwards, in later phases of the conflict, it was 
more related to subsequent ground-level strategic implications (Costalli and Moro 2012).  
However ethnicity remains, in last instance, the most dominant cleavage in nowadays 
Bosnian politics, while in Kosovo ethno-nationalist mobilisation was high even before the conflict. 
Indeed mobilisation across ethnic lines had a great “neighbouring effect” in the region, especially 
if we consider countries such as Montenegro that did not experience violence in its territory, but 
nonetheless had an increase in ethno-nationalism (Dyrstad 2012). This can possibly be the case 
even for Albania, a country that has not experienced an ethnic conflict in its territory, but that 
nonetheless has a population with a profound sense of belonging to the nation and which, in 
turns, advances nationalist demands towards so-called irredent Albanian territories – especially 
towards Kosovo and western Macedonia.  
Considering all the complicated interethnic relations that exist in the Western Balkans 
region (Dyrstad 2012), we can ultimately say that “[i]n the Balkans, ethnic unrest is exacerbated 
by both the number of ethnic disputes and their proximity to their countries of ethnic origin – 
thus tying all the Balkan states (and beyond) into a common problem” (Griffiths 1993). As a 
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consequence, there still is in the Western Balkans a great danger of political fragmentation and 
of a “renationalisation” of politics as it was the case in the early ‘90s (Larrabee 1991).  
Insurgents  
From all this preamble stems a first important point: the main VNSAs that have been in 
play in the Western Balkans are definitely insurgents. The same Yugoslavia was a federation, thus 
implying the existence of subnational territorial entities with strong presence of a certain ethnic 
group. The constitution of 1974 had granted a higher degree of independence for the six 
republics and the two autonomous territories. An attempt made by Tito in order to soften 
centrifugal nationalist forces, in a country that by formation was multi-ethnic. However, Tito’s  
 
death in 1980 determined the fall of the strongest pillar of this unity, creating the conditions for 
the further violent developments in the region (Berend 1996). In fact in the ‘90s political and  
social turmoil reached its apex: “[a] heterodox creature between East and West, the Yugoslav  
federation imploded in a violent, ten-year-long agony, during which nationalist projects collided 
with each other” (Strazzari 2007:185).  
All the insurgents of the different subnational entities had control over their territory, and 
had authority on and the legitimation of the respective population. Every one of these groups 
achieved the goal of separatism and created new states for their ethnic groups. However, as was 
mentioned before, there still exist stalemate situations, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo but not 
only there. Indeed even in FYR Macedonia there are many nationalist demands from the 
Albanian minority.  
Jihadi Groups  
As to what pertains jihadi groups, the Western Balkans are a perfect hub for Islamic 
radicalization due to the presence of both unresolved conflicts and of marginalized (sub)urban 
areas, or of zones of identity and social cleavages (Manciulli 2017). Economic backwardness 
creates the necessary room for manoeuvre for local preachers and/or NGOs that can influence 
(usually less educated) people (Gall 2017). Therefore, the area that ideally encompasses Bosnia, 
Kosovo, Albania and FYR Macedonia – where the vast majority of Islamic believers in the region 
reside – can become and, partly, have already become a sort of “free zone” for the development 
of radical Islamic cells, as a consequence even of the partial control that states have on this area 
(Vespa 2017).  
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Even though the Islam of the Balkans has always been a moderate one which sees the 
quasi-personal relationship between the individual and Allah, “[n]onetheless, [in the Balkans] 
religious authorities, intellectuals, and lay believers differ considerably in their interpretation of 
the core religious doctrine and practices, and generally, what it means to be a “good” Muslim in 
a particular society and at specific moments in time.” (Elbasani and Tosic 2017:3).  
Notwithstanding the presence of this localized Islam, there exists a jihadist network that 
transcends states’ boundaries and supports the creation and maintenance of radicalized cells. The 
islamist world intercepts some trajectories of modern globalization, as it can be seen from the  
presence of different connection networks among groups and cells belonging to the global jihad. 
Despite the deeply-rooted presence in a determined political and social context, islamist networks 
are also heavily supported by the complex global islamist community.  
Warlords  
Especially during the Bosnian conflict, the Balkans saw the emergence of many figures 
that can be related up to a certain extent with the warlord type. Characters such as Jusuf Prazina 
(aka Juka), a Bosnian warlord that occupied mount Igman – a few kilometres from Sarajevo – 
and who, in that occasion, fought against another warlord – i.e. Zulkifar Alispago (aka Zuka) – 
proliferated during those years (Strazzari 2008:102-103). However, with the end of the war, the 
warlord type ceased to exist since all the territories were incorporated under the control of the 
new “states” that emerged. The warlord type is probably the one that needs most a state fragility 
or failure, because the warlord is not only strictly connected to warfare logics but also because 
only when the state is absent a warlord can control a certain piece of territory for a sufficient 
amount of time.  
Criminal gangs  
During the ‘90s, the collusion between legal and extra-legal was a marker of Western 
Balkans dynamics (Strazzari 2008). This dynamics revolved around state fragility and loss of 
sovereignty. For example, in Albania, in the state failure of 1997, criminal gangs ruled many of 
the territories, especially in the South (Rich ed. 1999). But, since criminal gangs do not need 
either authority over territory or authority over population, they continued to exist even after the 
Balkan wars. Indeed, one of the main problems of nowadays Albania is the one of criminal gangs 
connected to drugs cultivation and trafficking.  
In many of these contexts, during and after the war, these criminal gangs existed and acted 
in complicity with the state apparatus. For this reason many concerns arrive from the Balkans, 
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where the fusion between legal and extra-legal permits allows for the creation of spaces when 
smugglers traffic drugs, weapons, human beings etc.  
 
Security Concerns and Policy Implications  
Although the Balkans have lived a decade of relative stability, we cannot say that peace is 
definitively achieved. The system analysed until now presented a highly volatile environment, 
which in turn has generated very cumbersome channels for conflict management, if not at all. 
Security in the Western Balkans depends on the different ethno-nationalisms clashing with each 
other, and this does have an influence on the security of the whole continent. This is the why 
Western powers have tried to tie the Western Balkans future – economically and militarily – to 
the standards of the West. Anyhow an analysis of the security issues emerging from such an 
environment must be tackled, if we want to address even (possible) policy implications.  
Insurgents  
Insurgents present the worst case of VNSAs from the state viewpoint, mainly because 
insurgents can rely both on the authority over a specific territory and on the legitimation granted 
by the people which live in that territory. Insurgents have heavy grassroots support, since the 
future of their campaign is linked to the same survival of that precise ethnic group. Still we have 
a couple of situations in the Balkans that can possibly lead to further friction: the abovementioned 
“frozen conflicts” in Bosnia and Kosovo. Both of these situations appear as insurmountable 
problems in the path of the European integration of the respective countries. The Dayton 
Agreement of 1995, although managed to close the war and end the bloodshed in Bosnia, proved 
to be too rigid for any further development. In Kosovo, on the other hand, the main problems 
come from the northern Serbian municipalities – sort of insurgents inside insurgents, a topic very 
much debated in the literature. Moreover, problems can arise even in FYR Macedonia, since it 
sees a huge presence of Albanian minorities.  
The problem of insurgency is one of the main ones for multi-ethnic countries, since the 
desire for an ideal nation-hood of a certain minority can always be actionable by political elites 
for their purposes, thus making this kind of issue ever present.  
Jihadi Groups  
One of the future problems with jihadi groups will be the deradicalization of the returnees, 
especially women and children (The Soufan Group 2017; Morina 2017). It will be necessary the 
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creation of methods to include once again these individuals in the social context. If we consider 
the importance that younger generations wield in the perpetuation of the message and the 
political-ideological projections of jihad, it clearly emerges the centrality of the issue. Moreover, 
it is needed to apply even practices of deradicalization of people that are already radicalized, both 
in the jail system and in marginalized zones. Not only: many people of Balkan origin that were 
radicalized during the Balkan wars – or that eventually took part in those conflicts during  
the ‘90s – kept the islamist worldview up until nowadays (Vidino 2017).  
In perspective, the integration in the European Union represents a key point in the 
political and social evolution of the Western Balkans. Indeed, if we consider economic 
backwardness as the one of the main factors that fuel Islamic radicalization in marginalized areas, 
economic and institutional development of these countries vis-à-vis integration is a crucial aspect 
in the analysis of the future of jihadism in the region. The economies of these countries are still 
fragile and many segments of the population struggle to see any improvement in their daily life. 
Thus economic development is one of the hinge points around which revolves the whole fight on 
jihadism. The European Union must necessarily pose itself as a credible interlocutor in this fight.  
Warlords  
Warlords are more proper to situations where the state has failed or is about to, 
considering that this would provide a necessary window of opportunity for the warlord to impose 
its control on a determined piece of land (key feature of warlordism according to our typology). 
The overall (relative) stability of the Balkans provides (theoretically) no room for the emergence 
of new warlords. As soon as frictions escalate into conflicts, state organs have to be careful even 
about these aspects.  
Criminal Gangs  
Criminal gangs do not challenge the monopoly on the use of force by the state, and they 
do not present any authority on land or people. As a consequence, this remains a public security 
concern: criminal gangs do not undermine state sovereignty or integrity. In order to better tackle 
this problem, however, Western Balkans countries need to form more effective and efficient 
police forces, which would be able to counter the illegal actions of such groups. Even in this case, 
the role of the European Union and of NATO is crucial: they can provide frameworks already 
tested by the respective Member States police organs, useful information, data and best practices, 
while also creating a network to better tackle overall transnational organized crime.  
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The particular position of the Western Balkans – at the core of the European continent 
– makes this region very important for European security and, thus, for transatlantic relations as 
well. Indeed European security is one of the main reasons why, in recent decades, western powers 
have engaged in the Balkans and have tried to tie the future of these countries to democratic and 
liberal principles. It is known, in fact, that democracy is an important tool for channelling possible 
conflicts in peaceful paths, even more so when coupled with policies of post-conflict 
reconstruction and development.  
Therefore a crucial point consists in the cooperation of different type of international 
organisations when dealing with highly volatile environments such as the Western Balkans. This 
means that organisations such as the European Union and NATO have to integrate more their 
policies and, thus, to provide a coherent and holistic framework for the Western Balkans. Even 
if in theory this could be an important achievement, in practice it can be more difficult than 
expected. Different organisations follow different logics, with different agendas and different 
goals. While NATO is a more strategic and security organisation, the European Union tries to 
economically develop possible candidate countries. The harmonisation of these policies, 
therefore, can prove to be troublesome.  
 
Conclusions 
This paper had the aim to provide a framework of conceptualizing violent non-state actors 
(VNSAs) and to apply this framework to the Western Balkans. VNSAs emerge countering the 
state, and they do it by challenging the core essence of the state: i.e. the monopoly of the use of 
force. The state has this monopoly over a certain territory and towards a certain population. Since 
VNSAs mainly challenge the integrity of a state and its sovereignty, we can analyse them across 
the same lines of authority. Indeed, we can create a typology by intersecting the presence or not 
of authority of a VNSA over a certain territory with the presence or not of authority over a 
determined population. This gives us a grid (see Table 1, page 6) of categorization of VNSAs, the 
most important ones being insurgents, jihadi groups, warlords and criminal gangs (according to 
each intersection).  
If we consider the situation of the Western Balkans after the Cold War, we can see that 
the region has provided the ground for the emergence of each one of this types of VNSAs, each 
characterized by its own features, while bringing their respective security issues. While insurgents 
appear to be the worst problem for a state (since they have both authority over a specific territory 
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and authority of a distinct group of people), criminal gangs do not pose much of a threat for state 
integrity and sovereignty, relegating them to mere public security problems. The other two types 
provide online one reason of concern: jihadi groups have control over people, especially in 
marginalized and underdeveloped areas, while warlords impose their authority only over a certain 
piece of land.  
However, all of these types of VNSAs can be better tackled only through the means of a 
deep cooperation of international organizations (such as NATO or the European Union) and the 
Balkan countries, considering the fragility of the latter.  
 
References 
Monographies  
Anderson, Benedict (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism, rev. ed. London: Verso.  
Berend, Ivan T. (1996) Central and Eastern Europe 1944-1993: Detour from the periphery to 
the periphery. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Kalyvas, Stathis (2006) The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Manciulli, Andrea (2017) Sconfiggere il terrorismo. L’evoluzione della minaccia jihadista e gli 
strumenti legislativi di contrasto. Camera dei Deputati.  
Marten, Kimberly (2012) Warlords: Strong-Arm Brokers in Weak States. New York: Cornell 
University Press.  
Rich, Paul B. (ed.) (1999) Warlords in International Relations. London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Strazzari, Francesco (2008) Notte balcanica. Guerre, crimine, stati falliti alle soglie d’Europa. 
Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino.  
Toft, Monica Duffy (2003) The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests and the 
Indivisibility of Territory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Vinci, Anthony (2009) Armed Groups and the Balance of Power: The International Relations of 
Terrorists, Warlords and Insurgents. New York: Routledge.  
Journal Articles  
13 
 
Costalli, Stefano and Francesco Niccolò Moro (2012) “Ethnicity and strategy in the Bosnian civil 
war: Explanations for the severity of violence in Bosnian municipalities” Journal of Peace 
Research 49 (6): 801–815.  
Dyrstad, Karin (2012) “After ethnic civil war: Ethno-nationalism in the Western Balkans” Journal 
of Peace Research 49 (6): 817-831.  
Elbasani, Arolda (2015) “Introduction: Nation, State and Faith in the Post-Communist Era” in 
Arolda Elbasani and Olivier Roy (eds) The Revival of Islam in the Balkans. From Identity 
to Religiosity. London: Palgrave MacMillan.  
Elbasani, Arolda and Olivier Roy (2015) “Islam in the post-Communist Balkans: alternative 
pathways to God” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 
Elbasani, Arolda and Jelena Tošić (2017) “Localized Islam(s): interpreting agents, competing 
narratives, and experiences of faith” Nationalities Papers. The Journal of Nationalism and 
Ethnicity  
Griffiths, Stephen Iwan (1993) “Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict Threats to European Security” 
SIPRI Research Report No.5. New York: Oxford University Press.  
Larrabee, Stephen L. (1991) “Long Memories and Short Fuses: Change and Instability in the 
Balkans” International Security 15 (3): 58-91.   
Strazzari, Francesco (2007) “The Decade Horribilis: Organized Violence and Organized Crime  
along the Balkan Peripheries, 1991–2001” Mediterranean Politics 12 (2): 185-209.  
The Soufan Group (2017) Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees 
TSG, October.  
Toft, Monica Duffy (2007) “Getting Religion?: The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War” 
International Security 31 (4): 97-131.  
Toft, Monica Duffy and Yuri M. Zhukov (2015) “Islamists and Nationalists: Rebel Motivation 
and Counterinsurgency in Russia’s North Caucasus” American Political Science Review 
109 (2): 222-238.  
Varshney, Ashutosh (2003) “Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Rationality.” Perspectives on 
Politics 1 (1): 85–99.  
Wilhelmsen, Julie (2005) “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Islamisation of the Chechen 
Separatist Movement” Europe-Asia Studies 57 (1): 35-59.  
14 
 
Newspaper and Magazine Articles 
Gall, Carlotta (2016) “How Kosovo Was Turned Into Fertile Ground for ISIS” New York, New 
York Times, 21 maggio 2016.  
Morina, Die (2017) “Kosovo Braces for Security Challenge of Returning Fighters” Belgrade, 
Balkan Insight, 16 novembre 2017.  
Pioppi, Stefano (2017) “Come contrastare la minaccia jihadista che arriva dai Balcani” Airpress, 
16 marzo 2017.   
Vespa, Stefano (2017) “Come e perché i Balcani sono una palestra per il radicalismo terroristico” 
Formiche, 17 marzo 2017.  
Vidino, Lorenzo (2017) “Dalla provincia alla Siria, quando la jihad è di famiglia” Torino, La 
Stampa, 28 gennaio 2018.  
